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Andrew A. Samwick 
The Tax  Reform Act of  1986 (TRA86) was the culmination of  a concerted 
effort by  the Congress and the president to improve the efficiency and per- 
ceived equity of the federal tax system.  As conspicuous examples of special tax 
treatment for particular types of income (and particular groups of taxpayers), 
investments known as tax shelters received a great deal of attention in the legis- 
lative debate.’ Tax  shelters are investments designed to create losses for tax 
purposes that, when added to income earned from other sources in the calcula- 
tion of a taxpayer’s total income, “shelter” that income from taxation. Invest- 
ments in real estate, oil and gas exploration, and other favored sectors, espe- 
cially when debt financed, can create such tax losses even while generating 
positive economic income and cash flows. 
Tax shelters are typically organized as limited partnerships in which the in- 
vestor has no management role. An otherwise high-income taxpayer could, 
with very little direct effort, utilize tax shelter losses to lower his or her average 
tax rate below that of a low-income taxpayer without tax shelter losses, thereby 
undermining the vertical equity of the federal tax system. As an indication of 
how important tax shelters were in reducing the tax liabilities of high-income 
taxpayers, Petska (1992) reports that for the group of  taxpayers in 1986 with 
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at least $250,000 in positive income and an average tax burden of 5 percent or 
less on it, partnership losses offset over 40 percent of positive income.* 
The direct assault on this type of “abuse” of tax shelters came from the new 
“passive loss” rules enacted by TRA86 in section 469 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. These rules limited the extent to which losses from activities in which 
the investor did not “materially participate” could offset positive income from 
other sources  such as wages, capital gains,  and dividends. For investments 
made after TRA86, passive losses can be offset only against income from pas- 
sive activities. Any  excess losses are disallowed as a current deduction until 
the taxpayer disposes of the activity that generates the loss or realizes sufficient 
passive income to apply against the 10sses.~  In order to satisfy the material 
participation standard, a taxpayer’s involvement in the activity must be regular, 
continuous, and substantial. Although material participation in more than one 
activity is possible, a taxpayer is most likely to materially participate only in 
his or her principal trade or business. More important, limited partnership in- 
terests are automatically presumed to be passive activities. The passive loss 
rules therefore effectively sever the link between the tax losses from a shelter 
and the tax liability due on other forms of income in a given year. 
There is little doubt that investments in tax shelters have all but disappeared 
since the enactment of TRA86. Tabulations of form D filings with the Securi- 
ties and Exchange Commission compiled by Robert A. Stanger & Co. show 
that public sales of limited partnerships fell from $13.1 billion in 1986 to $7.6 
billion in 1989 and $2.6 billion in 1992 after 15 prior years of growth. Tabula- 
tions of partnership schedule K returns in Wheeler (1994) show a similar pat- 
tern in net income from limited partnerships. Between 1983 and 1986, aggre- 
gate net losses increased from $18.7 to $35.5 billion. By 1989 and 1992, net 
losses had fallen to $21.6 and $3.3 billion, respectively. It is steadfastly be- 
lieved that the passive loss rules were the death blow to abusive tax shelters, 
where abuse can generally be said to occur when a taxpayer invests solely to 
lower tax liability, without any regard for economic profit.? According to IRS 
Deputy Chief Counsel Peter K. Scott, “The passive loss rules pretty much put 
the final nail in the coffin, in terms of  the tax shelter business”  (quoted in 
Moriarty and Rosen 1988,920).  The passive loss rules were also cited as criti- 
cal to the elimination of tax shelters in economic analyses of TRA86.5 
2. Positive income here refers to the total of all positive sources of income before the netting 
out of any losses. 
3. For investments made prior to TRA86, the passive loss limitations were phased in over five 
years: 35 percent in 1987,60 percent in 1988, 80 percent in 1989, and 90 percent in 1990. During 
the phase-in period, any passive losses not disallowed were included as a tax preference in the 
calculation of  the alternative minimum tax. Becker (1987), Brumbaugh and Ward  (1987). and 
Keligan (1987) provide detailed descriptions of  the passive loss rules. 
4. Cordes and Galper (1985) present a more systematic classification of popular and legal defi- 
nitions of tax shelters. 
5. See, e.g., Auerbach (1987), Musgrave (1987). and Pechman (1987) in the symposium on 
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Assigning the passive loss rules the credit for killing the tax shelters on the 
basis of the decline of tax shelters since its adoption may be premature because 
TRA86 also squeezed tax shelters in two other ways that were unrelated to the 
passive loss rules. The first was by  reducing the magnitude of the losses that 
could be generated by a given tax-sheltered investment. The schedules for the 
depreciation of  some assets typical of  tax shelters, most notably real estate, 
were lengthened. The longer the time period over which an asset must be de- 
preciated for tax purposes, the lower is the present value of  the depreciation 
deductions. TRA86 also repealed the investment tax credit (ITC), which had 
previously allowed up to 10 percent of the cost of an investment to be deducted 
from the investor’s tax liability in the year it was purchased. The second was 
by  reducing the tax  benefit that  a taxpayer could claim from a given loss. 
TRA86 reduced marginal tax rates on ordinary income at the high end of the 
income distribution and repealed the 60 percent exclusion on long-term capital 
gains. These two measures reduced the after-tax value of losses while the asset 
was held and raised the tax rate paid on the gain generated when the asset was 
sold, respectively. 
Accurately determining the importance of the passive loss rules in eliminat- 
ing tax shelters is of economic significance because the passive loss rules do 
not distinguish between abusive tax shelters and legitimate economic enter- 
prises that are organized as partnerships and happen to lose money. The passive 
loss limitations are so broadly applicable that they may  also be disallowing 
the deductibility of genuine economic losses and thereby discouraging ex ante 
productive investment. Although the passive loss rules have been criticized by 
legal scholars,6  the supposition that in the absence of these rules there would 
still be tax shelter abuse is held out as an offsetting benefit. The notion that the 
declining marginal tax rates or the repeals of  the ITC and long-term capital 
gain exclusion could have played an important role in the demise of tax shelters 
is absent from the textbook legal analysis of the effect of TRA86 on tax shel- 
ters (Chirelstein 1994, 268). Given the potential for the passive loss rules to 
inhibit productive economic investments, that they may have been sufficient to 
eliminate tax  shelters is not the relevant issue. The purpose of  this paper is 
to answer the more important question of whether they were necessary to ac- 
complish that goal, given the other changes enacted by TRA86. 
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 address the issues 
related to legitimate tax shelters, that is, those in which transactions are as- 
sumed to take place at a fair market value. Section 7.1 illustrates with three 
examples the  operation  of  tax  shelters before TRA86,  the  impact  of  the 
changes enacted by TRA86, and the role of the passive loss rules in eliminating 
tax shelters. The substantive conclusion is that the passive loss limitations only 
affect the deferral of income. To the extent that tax shelters provide other bene- 
6.  Examples include Bankman (1989), Peroni (1988), Zelenak (1989a, 1989b), and Sims (1994). 
Johnson (1989) argues in support of  the passive loss rules, in a response to Zelenak (1989a). 196  Andrew A. Samwick 
fits, such as the conversion of ordinary income to capital gains, the passive loss 
limitations were of secondary importance. The repeal of the ITC and long- 
term capital gain exclusion were more important by comparison. Section 7.2 
discusses the implications of these results for the existence of a clientele for 
tax shelters after TRA86 by  examining the change in the distribution of mar- 
ginal tax rates in a panel of tax returns. Once again, the reforms other than the 
passive loss rules are shown to be critical, this time in removing the positive 
correlation between the after-tax rate of return on a tax shelter and the invest- 
or’s marginal tax rate. 
The emphasis is then shifted in section 7.3 to so-called abusive tax shelters, 
more precisely, those in which the asset’s basis for depreciation can be artifi- 
cially overstated to achieve arbitrarily large depreciation allowances without 
subsequent recapture. Such transactions are pure deferral; hence, the passive 
loss rules will eliminate them. As Sims (1994) argues, however, a more sens- 
ible policy could have been formulated by focusing on the loopholes that en- 
able the basis to be overstated without sufficient penalty rather than the appear- 
ance of losses in general. Section 7.4 investigates another hypothesis for why 
passive loss limitations were enacted, namely, to satisfy short-term distribu- 
tional goals in  a comprehensive tax reform. Using cross-sectional tax return 
data, it is shown that approximately half of the passive losses disallowed during 
the phase-in period for the new rules were realized by the top 0.60 percent of 
the income distribution. Section 7.5 concludes. 
7.1  Tax Shelters before and after TRA 
The basic idea underlying a tax shelter is alarmingly simple: to take a dollar 
of income and lower the value of the taxes that must be paid on it. Although 
investments commonly known as tax shelters are not the only ways to exploit 
the tax preferences in  the Internal Revenue Code, they are among the least 
straightforward.’ This section begins by describing the salient features of a tax- 
sheltered investment and then illustrates these features, and the changes en- 
acted by  TRA86, using examples of  tax shelters typical  of the pre-TRA86 
period. 
7.1.1  Components of a Tax Shelter 
There are two principal ways that income tax burdens can be lowered in a 
tax shelter. The first is by deferring the tax liability into future years. If interest 
rates are positive, then the present value of a tax payment can be lowered by 
shifting it into later years because the investor can earn interest on the tax 
7. A much simpler way  to confer a tax advantage is to simply exempt the asset’s return from 
taxation, as in the case of municipal bonds. Fierro (1981) is an informative-and  entertaining- 
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liability  during the interim. The second is by converting the taxable income 
from ordinary income to capital gain income, which has typically been taxed 
at a lower rate. Without  deferral or conversion,  there is no tax  shelter. The 
source of both deferral and conversion is depreciation-not  the actual physical 
deterioration of capital-but  the magnitude of the deduction from income that 
the owner of the asset is allowed to claim for tax purposes. If the depreciation 
allowances correspond to the economic depreciation of the asset, then there is 
no tax advantage to the investment under an income tax system.8 In practice, 
the tax advantage comes from depreciation allowances that are larger than eco- 
nomic  depreciation  during the earlier years  of  the in~estment.~  Even if  the 
amount taken in depreciation is added (for tax purposes) to the proceeds from 
the eventual sale of the asset, the investor benefits by deferring the tax until the 
date of the sale, Depreciation allowances become even more valuable if, when 
the asset is sold, the proceeds are taxed at a lower rate, such as that prevailing 
on capital gains before TRA86. In this way,  the depreciation allowances are 
converted from ordinary to capital income. 
As will be shown in section 7.2, an investment in a depreciable asset is not 
likely to function as a tax shelter unless  it is debt financed. By borrowing a 
portion of the funds required for the initial investment in the asset, the investor 
can claim the depreciation on the full investment, deduct the interest payments 
on the borrowed  funds from taxable income, and pay off the debt when the 
shelter is disposed of. Investors with the highest marginal tax rates naturally 
benefit most from the deductibility of interest payments. As the leverage in the 
deal is increased, the tax losses grow relative to the personal funds contributed 
by  the  investor, thereby  allowing more of  the investor’s other income to be 
sheltered from taxation for a given depreciable asset. The associated economic 
cost of leverage is that it also increases the investor’s exposure to risk. Addi- 
tionally, it is the use of leverage to finance tax-sheltered investments-and  the 
notion that higher leverage might in some cases not actually imply an increase 
in exposure-that  has historically drawn the scrutiny of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and motivated congressional reforms  such as the passive loss 
rules. 
Investors in tax shelters are almost always purchasing interests in limited 
partnerships, either publicly traded or privately placed. The pooling together 
of numerous investors confers the advantages of diversification and economies 
of  scale in transactions. Beyond pooling, the limited partnership has two fea- 
tures that recommend it as the organizational form for tax shelters. First, the 
partnership itself is not a taxable entity. Instead, income and losses from the 
investments “pass through” to the individual partners’ tax returns. There is also 
8. This point is well demonstrated by  Warren  (1985) and other comparisons of  income and 
consumption tax systems. 
9. Scholes and Wolfson (1992, 393) define a tax shelter in precisely this way: “an asset in which 
the investment cost can be deducted from taxable income at a rate that exceeds its economic depre- 
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flexibility in the allocation of income and losses to different partners over time. 
If the same investment were made by a C-corporation, the investors (as stock- 
holders) would have no flexibility in allocations and any income produced by 
the investment would be subject to both corporate and personal income tax. 
Second, the liability of a limited partner is restricted to the amount of money 
contributed or pledged by  that partner to the partnership, just as a corporate 
stockholder’s liability is confined to the amount of stock purchased. If the in- 
vestment were made by a sole proprietor, his liability would be unlimited. The 
examples that follow can easily be understood as the investor’s share of inter- 
ests in a limited partnership. 
7.1.2  Cattle Feeding 
A straightforward example of a tax shelter that produces only the deferral 
of income tax is that of cattle feeding. The idea behind the shelter is to pur- 
chase steers that weigh up to 700 pounds, fatten them up through six months 
of constant feeding, and then sell them to slaughterhouses at weights of over 
1,000 pounds. The investment is a shelter because the feed consumed by the 
cattle plus all the fees incurred for veterinary services and management of the 
feedlot are considered to be tax deductible in the year they are incurred. How- 
ever, the income realized from the sale of the cattle will not be taxed until the 
date of sale. Cattle-feeding shelters are organized in July or August for poten- 
tial sale in the early months of the following year. With good timing, all of 
the expenses can be made in the first year and all sales can be made in the 
subsequent year. 
The risks involved with the cattle-feeding shelter are that the market for 
fattened cattle is highly competitive and that the actual amount of weight that 
can be put on a steer is subject to random events such as cold weather and 
disease. Although futures markets exist for both cattle and grain, they have 
typically locked in very slim profit margins, and the use of futures markets to 
hedge risk may draw the attention of  the IRS. Swanson and Swanson (1985) 
cite a cattle-feeding tax shelter from November  1979 in which feeder cattle 
were selling for $0.80 per pound, the expenses for fattening were estimated at 
$0.47 per pound, and the futures price of fully fattened cattle for delivery in 
April 1980 was $0.725 per pound. Using these estimates, purchasing a 650- 
pound steer and adding 450 pounds to it would have cost the investor 520 + 
252 = $772. Selling a cattle future for delivery in April would have yielded 
1,100*0.725 = $797, for a profit of $25. For tax purposes, the investor would 
have shown a $252 loss in 1979 and $277 in income in 1980. 
In a cattle-feeding shelter, both the loss and the income are treated as ordi- 
nary income, so there is no conversion into capital gains. Moreover, since the 
fattening process takes only six months, such a shelter is really useful only 
when the taxpayer can foresee a reduction in his marginal tax rate during the 
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gain or one who is planning to retire the next year would be a good candidate 
for the cattle-feeding shelter. The shelter operates, in essence, by  exploiting 
the progressivity of the tax schedule. By adding losses in the year in which the 
marginal tax rate is high and income in the year in which the marginal tax rate 
is low, the taxpayer can lower his overall tax liability. 
Table 7.1 shows the extent to which taxpayer can utilize a deferral shelter in 
the pre-TRA86 (1986) and post-TRA86 (1988) periods. Four sets of income 
declines over a two-year period are presented. The first three rows of the table 
show the effects for a taxpayer with  a first-year income of  $96,000 and a 
second-year income of $32,000 using a deferral shelter to transfer $32,000 of 
this income from the first year to the second, thereby equalizing a tax liability 
across the two years.’O Using the 1986 tax table for a joint return, this results 
in a decline in the two-year tax liability of $2,537. The three other examples 
in the table also show gains from the tax shelter, ranging from $850 when the 
taxpayer shifts only $24,000 to $3,531 when the taxpayer defers $60,000 in 
income. The tax savings are on the order of 5 percent of the unsheltered tax lia- 
bility. “ 
To demonstrate the effect of TRA86 on pure deferral shelters, the analogous 
tax savings are computed for the four shelters using the 1988 tax schedule.12 
TRA86 compressed the existing tax schedule with 14 tax brackets and a top 
marginal tax rate of 50 percent into a 2-bracket schedule with a top marginal 
tax  rate of  28 percent. The table shows that  the tax  savings are generally 
smaller in absolute magnitude after TRA86. The decline is particularly appar- 
ent for the last shelter, which involves the highest income and the most deferral 
because TRA86 lowered the marginal tax rates most dramatically at the high 
end of the income distribution. The exception to this pattern is the second shel- 
ter, in which the amount of deferral increases using the post-TRA86 schedule. 
The reason is that the 1988 schedule imposed a 5 percentage point surtax on a 
range of income to phase out the benefits of the lower inframarginal tax rates 
for taxpayers above targeted income levels. When the phase-out was  com- 
pleted, the taxpayer had a 28 percent average tax rate on all taxable income, 
but within the phase-out range, the marginal tax rate was 33 percent. Since the 
phase-out range for a joint return was $7 1,900-$149,250,  smoothing income 
to exactly $72,000 in 1988 was particularly advantage0~s.l~ 
To  summarize, pure deferral shelters such as the cattle-feeding shelter de- 
10. For simplicity, the discounting of the tax losses from the second year that is appropriate for 
these comparisons is omitted. 
11. The tension between horizontal equity and a progressive tax schedule has been the subject 
of numerous articles on “the marriage tax.” See, e.g., Rosen (1987). 
12. The 1988 schedule is used because the 1987 schedule was a transitional one to allow for the 
phase in of  the marginal tax rate changes. The top marginal tax rate in 1987 was 38.5 percent. 
13. This “bubble” in the marginal tax rates also accounts for the negative gain from deferral in 
the fourth shelter, as this shelter shifts income in both years into the phase-out range from the 28 
percent marginal rate regions on both sides of it. The bubble was replaced in 1990 by a top mar- 
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Table 7.1  Effects of Deferral Shelter before and after TRA86 
Without Cattle Shelter 
Year 1  Year 2  Year 1  Year 2 
Item  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  from Shelter" 
With Cattle Shelter 
Tax Gain 
Income  96,000  32,000  64,000  64,000 
Tax (1986)h  29,603  5,102  16,084  16,084  2,537 
Tax (1988)h  24.2 18  5,093  14,053  14,053  1,205 
Income  96,000  48,000  72,000  72,000 
Tax (1986)  29,603  10,075  19,414  19,414  850 
Tax (1988)  24,218  9,573  16,298  16,298  1,195 
Income  120,000  60,000  90,000  90,000 
Tax (1986)  40.48 1  14,564  26,974  26,974  1,097 
Tax (1988)  32,138  12,933  22,238  22,238  595 
Income  180,000  60,000  120,000  120,000 
Tax ( 1986)  69,929  14,564  40,48 1  40,48  I  3,531 
Tax (1988)  50,400  12,933  32,138  32,138  -943 
4Difference between the total tax paid without the shelter (sum of cols. [I] and [2]) and the total 
tax paid with the shelter (sum of cols. [3] and [4]). 
"Tax (1986) and Tax (1988) are the tax liabilities on the taxable income specified in the top row 
of each group according to the tax tables for the respective years, assuming the taxpayer files a 
joint return. 
scribed here typically offered modest tax relief in the pre-TRA86 period for 
taxpayers confronted with a one-time change in income levels. The magnitude 
of the tax gain from deferral was generally reduced by TRA86, especially at 
high income levels, where due to an oddity in the tax schedule, deferral could 
have actually increased the tax liability.14 Finally, it is important to note that 
the passive loss limitations put an end to short-term deferral shelters used in 
this manner by disallowing the loss in the first year, forcing it to be realized in 
the second year when the cattle were sold, unless the temporarily high income 
in the first year was itself due to passive income. 
7.1.3  Equipment Leasing 
Equipment leasing was among the most popular tax shelters other than real 
estate in the pre-TRA86 period, thanks in large part to the implementation of 
the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) and a more generous ITC under 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. ACRS is a schedule of depreciation 
allowances that permits depreciation to be taken for tax purposes over 3-, 5, 
or 10-year periods; in each case, the depreciation period is considerably less 
14. Curiously, the enactment of TRA86 itself caused a one-time opportunity for all high-income 
taxpayers to profit by  deferral of income from the calendar year  1986 to  1988 because TRA86 
reduced top marginal tax rates from 50 to 28 percent. The Sfanger  Reporr discussed an investment 
strategy that capitalizes on this opportunity. ("Hoof It to Cattle in 1986" 1986). 201  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
than the useful life of the investment. The ITC was an even more generous tax 
incentive, returning up to 10 percent of the cost of an asset in the year it was 
purchased. Because the ITC is a credit rather than a deduction, it reduces the 
investor’s tax  liability  (not the investor’s taxable income) dollar for dollar. 
TRA86 repealed the ITC, and although it did not  directly  alter ACRS for 
equipment, the reduction in top marginal tax rates lowered the after-tax value 
of  depreciation deductions. Because the sale of leased equipment generates 
ordinary income rather than a capital gain, equipment leasing did not shelter 
income through conversion, and TRA86’s repeal of the 60 percent exclusion 
does not come into play. 
The customers of  an equipment-leasing partnership are corporations that, 
for any of a number of reasons, prefer not to own their machinery. The most 
compelling reason is that because  of  low income or unused  tax losses, the 
corporation cannot benefit from depreciating the assets it owns. By leasing, it 
can share the benefits of the tax deductions taken by the partnership. Alterna- 
tively, the corporation may choose to lease to avoid a long-term commitment 
to a particular level of technology or to reduce monthly payments and conserve 
on cash flows. The benefits to the partnership are the rents that it charges its 
customers, the depreciation deductions and ITC taken on the equipment, and 
the residual value of the equipment at the end of the lease. 
As with any tax shelter, there are several risks associated with equipment 
leasing. The major risk is that the equipment will become obsolete due to tech- 
nological advances in the relevant industries. If the equipment becomes obso- 
lete, then the partnership will have a difficult time setting up subsequent leases 
after the initial one or recouping any of the original value through the sale of 
the equipment. The government has  also increased  the risk associated with 
leasing by requiring that the lease be short term (no more than half the depre- 
ciable life of the asset) in order to qualify for the ITC. The other requirement 
for the ITC is that the lease be actively managed, which in practice requires 
that 15 percent of the rent on the equipment be paid out for maintenance and 
related expenses. The most straightforward way to avoid these risks is to lease 
equipment that has little chance of becoming obsolete, like a box. When was 
the last time technology improved on a rectangle? Commonly leased equip- 
ment includes boxcars, shipping containers, and barges. The low risk of obso- 
lescence ensures continuity of leasing customers or potential buyers for a sale 
of  the equipment. 
The important elements of an equipment lease are presented in table 7.2.15 
The investor purchases a $10,000 interest in a partnership that uses no debt in 
purchasing the assets (the leveraged investment will be presented in table 7.3). 
The assets are assumed to have a depreciable life of five years under ACRS, 
and for simplicity, it is assumed that the partnership can obtain three identical 
15. The structure of this tax shelter is based on those described in “Equipment Leasing Partner- 
ships” (1984) and Swanson and Swanson (1985). 202  Andrew A. Samwick 
Table 7.2  Unleveraged Equipment-Leasing  Tax Shelter before and after TRA86 
Year 
Cash Flow  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
A. Assumptions 






B. Pre-TRAM with ITC 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000 
IRR  8.22 
C.  Pre-TRAM without ITC 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,OOO 
IRR  5.64 
D. Pre-TRA86 with PLL 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000 
IRR  6.58 
E. Post-TRAM without PLL 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000 
IRR  7.24 
E Post-TRAM with PLL 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,OOO 
IRR  6.78 
Initial outlay  -  10,000 
0  0 
1,200  1,200 
-180  -180 
-1,500  -2,200 
-  1,OOO 
0  0  0  0 
1,200 












-480  -1,180 
-1,240  -590 
2,260  1,610 
-  1,080 
-540 
1,560 
-  1,080 
-  540 
1,560 






-480  -1,180 
-240  -590 
1,260  1,610 
-  1,080 
-  540 
1,560 
-  1,080 
-540 
1,560 






0  0 
0  0 













-480  -1,180 
-134  -330 
1,154  1,350 
-  1,080 
-302 
1,322 
-  1,080 
-  302 
1,322 
-  1,080 





0  0 
0  0 













Note; See text (sec. 7.1.3) for assumptions. IRR values are percentages. 
two-year leases and then sell the equipment for 90 percent of the original pur- 
chase price. This generates an ITC of $1,0o0, available in the first year of oper- 
ation. Rental income is assumed to be 12 percent of the initial outlay. In order 
to qualify for the ITC, management and other fees of  15 percent of gross rent 
are paid out each year. The depreciation schedule allowed by ACRS generates 
deductions of  15 and 22 percent in the first two years and 21 percent in the 
remaining three years. 203  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Panel B computes the after-tax cash flows of the investment during the pre- 
TRA86 period with the ITC in place. Taxable income each year is the rental 
income less management fees and depreciation. Taxes paid in each year are 
simply 50 percent of the taxable income for this high-income investor. In the 
first year, the taxes paid are reduced by the full amount of the ITC. Note that 
in every year, taxable income is negative. This is the amount of income from 
other sources that can be sheltered, and the after-tax value of  the shelter is 
given by the negative taxes paid. The after-tax cash flows are the rental income 
less management fees and taxes paid. Since the sale of the equipment in year 
six is treated as ordinary income, it can be added directly into the taxable in- 
come and after-tax cash flow for that year. Because the equipment was fully 
depreciated by the date of the sale, the full amount of the sale is taxable. This 
is known as “recapture” of the depreciation allowances, because every dollar 
taken in depreciation in an earlier year is subject to tax when the equipment is 
sold. Note, however, that the investor still enjoys the benefit of  defemng the 
taxes until the sixth year.16 
The internal rate of return (IRR) for this investment is computed to be 8.22 
percent.” The IRR is the interest rate such that, when the after-tax cash flows 
are discounted at this rate, the net present value of the investment is zero. Panel 
C shows that if the only change made by TRA86 was to repeal the ITC, then 
the IRR would fall to 5.64 percent. Incorporating another change enacted by 
TRA86, the reduction of the top marginal tax rate to 28 percent, in the calcula- 
tions in panel E increases the IRR to 7.24 percent. The seeming paradox that 
lowering the after-tax value of the depreciation deductions raises the IRR of 
the investment is resolved by noticing that, because there is no conversion of 
income to capital gains in an equipment-leasing shelter, the lower marginal tax 
rate increases the after-tax cash flow from the residual value of the equipment. 
The two effects tend to offset each other; if the residual value were lower, then 
lowering the marginal tax rate might have further reduced the IRR. Thus, a 
natural consequence of the base broadening (repeal the ITC) and rate reduction 
of TRA86 would be the shift toward the leasing of equipment with higher re- 
sidual values. 
Panel F demonstrates the effect of the passive loss limitations (PLL) on the 
IRR, assuming that the investor has no sources of  passive income in any of 
these years. In each year, the taxable income in the post-TRA86 scenario was 
16. Recapture will he a more interesting phenomenon in the real estate tax shelter discussed in 
17. That is, r such that 
the next example. 
C:=,  C,(I + r)-!  = 0. 
When the cash flows have exactly one change in sign, the IRR  is uniquely defined and projects 
with the higher IRRs have higher net present values. Some examples presented below will also 
have a negative cash flow in the last period, hut it will never he large enough to invalidate the 
correspondence between a higher present value of the investment and a higher IRR.  All IRRs are 
presented in nominal terms on after-tax cash flows. 204  Andrew A. Samwick 
negative. The passive loss rules prevent this negative income from being used 
to reduce the investor’s tax liability until the equipment is disposed of in year 
six. As in the cattle shelter discussed in the previous example, the passive loss 
rules in this case simply reduce the deferral built into the tax shelter. Compared 
to the removal of the ITC, the passive loss rules have a relatively minor effect 
on the value of the shelter when viewed appropriately as an investment in a 
depreciable asset.I8 
Table 7.3 repeats the analysis of the equipment-leasing tax shelter assuming 
that the partnership  borrows an amount equal to the partners’ equity invest- 
ments. In other words, to obtain the same equipment, the partners contribute 
only $5,000 and borrow $5,000 to be repaid at the end of six years. The annual 
interest rate on the loan is assumed to be 10 percent; the payments incurred by 
the loan are shown in the second row of the table. The most important feature 
of the leverage is that it does not necessarily reduce the value of the ITC or 
depreciation deductions the investors can claim; ACRS and ITC are based on 
the value of the equipment only. Leverage enables tax shelter investors to gen- 
erate higher tax losses for a given amount of equity investment. 
The second important feature of leverage is that the interest paid on the debt 
is tax deductible; therefore, the opportunity cost of funds is equal to (1 -  ~)*p, 
where T is the marginal tax rate and p is the interest rate on the debt. For the 
pre-TRA86 period, this amounts to 5 percent. Borrowing at 5 percent to invest 
in a project with an IRR of  8.22 or 5.64 or 6.58 percent is a value-enhancing 
undertaking; hence, the IRRs rise to 14.38,6.8  1, and 7.47 percent for the three 
pre-TRA86 scenarios. With leverage, the loss of the ITC is even more detri- 
mental to the IRR of the investment, and its consequences are still larger than 
those of the passive loss limitations. For the post-TRA86 period, the marginal 
tax rate is 28 percent, yielding an after-tax cost of funds of 7.2 percent. Since 
this rate is just slightly below the 7.24 percent IRR on the post-TRA86 shelter, 
the IRR is increased trivially to 7.28 percent by the borrowing. When the pas- 
sive loss limitations are incorporated,  leverage actually decreases the IRR on 
the investment to 5.81 percent. Note that if the marginal tax rate were still 50 
percent, the IRR in this case would increase, but borrowing at 7.2 percent to 
invest at 6.78 percent is value-reducing transaction. Thus, the reduction in mar- 
ginal tax rates can under some scenarios discourage the use of leverage after 
TRA to invest in tax shelters. By reducing the deferral and hence the IRR of a 
tax shelter, the passive loss limitations enhance this effect. 
Before concluding the analysis of equipment leasing, a word of caution is 
in order about the use of debt in a tax shelter. During the tax reforms of  1976 
and 1978, Congress enacted the “at-risk” rules for investments in order to curb 
18. This statement is true both before and after TRA86. Panel E imposes the passive loss limita- 
tions on the pre-TRA86 shelter, yielding an IRR of 6.58 percent, under the assumption that the 
passive loss limitations would have also affected the ITC (if they did not, their effects would be 
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Table 7.3  Leveraged Equipment-Leasing  Tax Shelter before and after TRA86 
Year 
Cash Flow  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
A. Assumptions 
Initial outlay  -  10,000 









After-tax cash flow  -5,000 
IRR  14.38 
C. Pre-TRA86 without ITC 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -5,000 
IRR  6.81 
D. Pre-TRA86 with PLL 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -5,000 
IRR  7.47 
E. Post-TRA without PLL 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -5,000 
IRR  7.28 
E Post-TRA86 with PLL 
Taxable income 
Taxes paid 
After-tax cash flow  -5,000 
IRR  5.81 
-500  -500 
1,200  1,200 
-180  -180 
-1,500  -2,200 
-1,OOO 
-980  -1,680 
-1,490  -840 
2,010  1,360 
-980  -1,680 
-490  -840 
1,010  1,360 
0  0 
0  0 
520  520 
-980  -1,680 
-274  -470 
794  990 
0  0 
0  0 
520  520 
-500 
1,200 
-  180 
-2,100 
-  1,580 
-790 
1,310 





5  20 








-  180 
-2,100 
-  1,580 
-790 
1,310 











5  20 







































Note: See text (sec. 7.1.3) for assumptions. IRR values are percentages. 
the use of leverage to purchase depreciable assets. The at-risk rules distinguish 
between nonrecourse and recourse debt. A nonrecourse debt contract limits the 
borrowers exposure to the value of the asset. A common example is the typical 
home mortgage. If the homeowner defaults, he loses his house, but if the value 
of  the house is less than the amount outstanding on the mortgage, he is not 
liable to make up the difference out of his other wealth. If he were, that would 
be recourse debt. The at-risk rules stipulate that if the investor finances the tax 206  Andrew A. Samwick 
shelter with nonrecourse debt, then the value of the tax preferences such as the 
ITC and ACRS are limited to the amount of the investment for which the inves- 
tor has personal recourse. In the leasing example, it has therefore been implic- 
itly assumed that if the lessees defaulted or the equipment became obsolete 
and could not be sold to cover the debt payments, the investor would have been 
required  to personally pay off the debt. The at-risk rules will be relevant in 
section 7.3 when the rationale for the passive loss limitations is analyzed for 
abusive tax shelters. 
The analysis of the equipment-leasing tax shelter yielded several interesting 
conclusions. The most important change due to TRA86 was the repeal of the 
ITC, the tax refund of  10 percent  of the cost of obtaining the asset. Over a 
short time horizon, the passive loss limitations had a relatively  small impact 
on the rate of return in the tax shelter once the ITC was repealed and the mar- 
ginal tax rates were lowered. The reduction  in top marginal tax rates could 
actually increase the rate of return on the tax shelter by reducing the tax liabil- 
ity on the residual value of  the equipment by more than the value of the lower 
depreciation  deductions. This finding will be important  in the discussion of 
tax shelter clienteles in section 7.2. This tradeoff also demonstrated that as a 
consequence of recapture of  depreciation,  there is sometimes a discrepancy 
across policy regimes between the size of tax losses and the rate of return on 
the investment. Further, the lower marginal tax rate discourages the use of le- 
verage in obtaining depreciable assets and encourages the use of assets with 
higher residual values in equipment-leasing  shelters. 
7.1.4  Real Estate Tax Shelters 
By far the most common type of tax-sheltered investment is real estate.19  As 
a  tax  shelter  before  TRA86, real  estate provided  not  only  deferral  of  tax 
through  depreciation  allowances but  conversion  of  income to capital  gains 
upon the sale of the property. Additionally, the magnification of tax benefits 
through leverage discussed in the equipment-leasing shelter is easier to obtain 
on real estate shelters because real estate is less affected by the at-risk rules. 
Mortgages are by their nature nonrecourse loans, but the tax code permits the 
full value of the initial investment to be used as the basis for depreciation al- 
lowances.20  Although the pre-TRA86 tax code was rife with special tax prefer- 
ences to encourage new construction, rehabilitation of historic structures, and 
provision of  low-income housing, a simple example of a real estate deal will 
suffice to show the operation of the tax advantages2' 
19. Tabulations in Petska (1992) show that in every year between 1985 and  1989, over half the 
losses in partnerships that reported net losses were in real estate partnerships. 
20. When implemented in  1976, real estate investments were exempt from the at-risk rules. 
TRA86 extended  the at-risk rules to real  estate  loans under  some circumstances.  See Becker 
(1987) and Owen, Robinson, and Plache (1987) for a full discussion of the effects of TRA86 on 
real estate investments. 
21. This tax shelter is also based on an example in Swanson and Swanson (1985). 207  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Table 7.4  Real Estate Tax Shelter before and after TRA86 
Year 
















After-tax cash flows  -25,000 
IRR at five years  21.88 







After-tax cash flows  -25,000 
IRR at five years  14.17 
D. Posr-TRA86 wirh PLL 
Depreciation 





IRR calculations  -25,000 
Capital gains tax 
IRR at five years  13.15 
8,000  8,640  9,331 
9,750  9,750  9,750 
9,000  8,910  8,809 
750  840  94  1 
75,000  74,250  73,410 
2,000  2,160  2,333 
108,000  116,640  125,971 
5,556  5,556  5,556 
-8,556  -7,986  -7,366 
-4,278  -3,993  -3,683 
94,444  88,889  83,333 
528  723  932 
3,175  3,175  3,175 
-6,175  -5,605  -4,985 
-1,729  -1,569  -1,396 
96,825  93,651  90,476 
-2,021  -1,701  -1,356 
3,175  3,175  3,175 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
96,825  93,651  90,476 
-3,750  -3,270  -2,752 















-  1,208 
87,302 


































Nore: See text (sec. 7.1.4) for assumptions. IRR values are percentages. 
Table 7.4 shows the cash flows associated with a real estate tax shelter that 
purchases a $100,000 property with a $25,000 down payment, depreciates the 
property for five years, and sells at the end of  five years to realize a capital 
gain. The mortgage is assumed to be for 25 years at an  interest rate of  12 
percent. Such a mortgage can be paid off with a constant annual payment of 
approximately 13 percent. The property is assumed to appreciate in value at a 208  Andrew A. Samwick 
nominal rate of 8 percent. Rents are assumed to be 8 percent of the property 
value each year, and property  taxes are assumed to be 2 percent per year.** 
These assumptions are shown in panel A. 
Panel B shows the after-tax cash flows and IRR for the pre-TRA86 period. 
The property is depreciated using straight-line depreciation over an  1  8-year 
period. This yields a depreciation allowance of $5,556 in each year. Note that 
the property’s basis for tax purposes is reduced each year by the depreciation 
allowance. Taxable income is then computed as the rental income less the sum 
of the mortgage interest, property taxes, and depreciation. The tax liability is 
simply half of taxable income at a top marginal tax rate of  50 percent, and 
because taxable income is negative each year, the investor reduces his overall 
tax liability through the shelter. The after-tax cash flow is computed as rent 
less the sum of the full mortgage payment, property taxes, and the tax liability. 
In the fifth year, the property is sold for $146,933, triggering a capital gain of 
$74,711 once the basis is deducted. Because 60 percent of the capital gain is 
excluded from ordinary taxation, the capital gains tax is 0.4*0.50*74,711, or 
$14,942. The capital gain net of its tax liability is the largest part of the after- 
tax cash flow in the fifth year. The leverage and tax preferences  on the real 
estate shelter make  the IRR on this investment a handsome 21.88 percent 
(though maintenance and other fees which would reduce cash flows have been 
omitted, or inadequately included as property taxes, for simpli~ity).~~ 
Panel C recomputes the after-tax cash flows to account for the changes in 
depreciation and tax rates enacted by TRA86 but does not impose the passive 
loss limitations. Depreciation schedules for real estate were lengthened from 
15, 18, or 19 years before TRA86 to 27.5 years for residential rental property 
and 3  1.5 years for nonresidential real property.24  Consequently, the annual de- 
preciation allowance is reduced to 100,000/3  1.5=$3,175. The lower deprecia- 
tion allowances result in smaller taxable losses to shelter other income. More- 
over, because the top marginal tax rate was reduced to 28 percent, the after-tax 
value of the depreciation deductions is lower. The repeal of the long-term capi- 
tal gain exclusion has the effect of increasing the capital gains tax rate from 20 
percent to 28 percent. This is different from the equipment-leasing shelter in 
which the sale of the equipment was taxed as ordinary income in both cases. 
In the real estate shelter, the marginal tax rates lower the after-tax cash flows 
on depreciation, interest payments, and capital gains. As a result of these three 
changes, the IRR after TRA86 falls to 14.17 percent. Another inconvenient 
22. In fact, real estate investments often have much better expected appreciation and rents than 
in this example; the assumptions are conservative here to demonstrate how the tax advantages can 
generate high rates of return for even mediocre investments. The sensitivity of the main conclu- 
sions drawn from this example to the conservative assumptions will be discussed below. 
23. The IRRs on real estate tax shelters were often inflated by  holding the investment until 
death, at which time the tax basis would be “stepped up” for the heirs, or by borrowing the initial 
investment from the tax shelter promoter at favorable interest rates. 
24. TRA86 also eliminated accelerated depreciation for real estate, requiring the use of straight- 
line depreciation. To keep the table as simple as possible, this change is not reflected in the calcula- 
tions. Straight-line depreciation is used for the pre-TRA86 shelter as well. 209  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of  1986 
feature of this shelter is that the lower tax losses have made the annual after- 
tax cash flows negative; this shelter actually requires inflows of cash during its 
years of operation. 
Panel D incorporates the passive loss limitations into the post-TRA86 com- 
putations. As in the equipment-leasing shelter, the passive loss limitations dis- 
allow the negative taxable income in each year before the disposition of the 
The disallowed passive losses are deducted from the cash flow when 
the property is sold in the fifth year. The passive loss limitations further reduce 
the after-tax cash flows in the years before disposition and increase the income 
in the year of disposition. The IRR on the shelter is reduced by about 1 percent- 
age point to 13.15 percent as a result of the passive loss rules. This reduction 
is small compared to that caused by the changes in the marginal tax rate, con- 
version, and the lengthening of the depreciation schedule.26 
The examples in this section were chosen to illustrate the means through 
which features of the tax code generate the benefits of tax shelters and to ascer- 
tain the importance of the passive loss limitations, which are thought to have 
been the fatal blow to tax shelters, relative to other provisions in the tax code. 
For a pure deferral shelter such as cattle feeding, the reductions in marginal tax 
rates at high income levels from 1986 to 1988 substantially reduced the already 
modest tax benefits of income smoothing. Due to the 33 percent bubble, how- 
ever, it was possible that deferral was in some cases a better deal after TRA86. 
The passive loss rules directly eliminated the benefits of pure deferral because 
they disallow all passive losses from offsetting one-time changes in nonpas- 
sive income. 
As the equipment-leasing and real estate shelters demonstrate, deferral of a 
given size tax liability is only one aspect of a tax shelter. Far more important 
to the shelters’ IRRs were the determinants of the size of the tax liability to be 
deferred-the  magnitude of the ITC, the length of the depreciation period, 
and the after-tax cost of debt to use as leverage-and  the differential between 
ordinary and capital gains tax rates, which determines the payoff to conversion. 
25. If the property were held for more than five years before being sold, the taxable income 
from the shelter would eventually turn positive as the interest component of the mortgage payment 
continued to fall and the difference between the rental income and the depreciation deduction 
continued to widen due to nominal appreciation of the property. In that case, disallowed passive 
losses could be applied to income before the property’s disposition. In the absence of the passive 
loss rules, most investors would refinance the mortgage to increase the fraction of the payment 
that is due to interest as soon as the investment ceased to have negative taxable income. 
26. Redoing the calculations assuming disposition after  10 years does not change any of the 
qualitative comparisons across tax regimes. Increasing the rental rate lowers the tax losses during 
the years before disposition both before and after TRA86. The effects of the marginal tax rate and 
depreciation changes are somewhat reduced, and the effects of the passive loss rules are greatly 
reduced because fewer losses are disallowed. At a rental rate of  12 percent, the IRRs are 28.58, 
23.65, and 23.62 percent for the pre-TRA86, post-TRA86, and post-TRA86 with passive loss 
limitations scenarios, respectively. Decreasing the appreciation rate on the property to 4  percent 
leaves the magnitudes of the IRR differences across regimes similar to those in table 7.4, as the 
lower appreciation creates both higher tax losses in the years before disposition but smaller gains 
to conversion upon disposition. The IRRs for the three regimes under this assumption are 12.26, 
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After these factors were taken into account, the effect of the passive loss rules 
on the IRRs of the equipment-leasing and real estate shelters was minor. The 
main consequence of  the passive loss rules in these cases was cosmetic; the 
passive loss rules eliminated only the reporting of  a tax loss from the invest- 
ment before its disposition. But to claim that this cosmetic change is of any 
importance beyond the effect it had on the IRR is to require that all tax shelter- 
ing be done solely for short-term deferral reasons (as in the cattle shelter) or 
that tax shelter investors systematically ignore the recapture of depreciation 
upon disposition of their investment. 
7.2  Tax Shelter Clienteles after TRA86 
The illustrative tax shelters in the previous section assumed that tax shelter 
investors faced the marginal tax rates for the highest-income taxpayers both 
before and after TRA86. To the extent that some investors faced lower marginal 
tax rates, the IRRs on these examples will not be representative of those actu- 
ally obtained. Additionally, the dispersion of  marginal tax rates of  investors 
has important implications for the pricing of tax shelters in a competitive equi- 
libri~m.~’  This section uses the University of Michigan panel of tax returns and 
the NBER TAXSIM program for calculating tax liabilities to determine the 
distribution of marginal tax rates on tax shelter investments across TRA86 and 
whether it is feasible for a market for tax shelters to exist after TRA86. 
Tax  shelters are not identified as such on an individual’s tax return. After 
TRA86, the best indication of whether the taxpayer is engaged in tax sheltering 
is whether any passive income or losses are listed on schedule E, where all 
amounts of  “supplemental income” are reported. Since the passive loss rules 
did not exist before TRA86, the distinction between passive and nonpassive 
income or losses is not made. It is therefore not possible to reliably distinguish 
between tax shelter investors and, say, a lawyer in an unprofitable legal partner- 
ship by examining only a cross section of pre-TRA86 tax returns. Instead, a 
panel of tax returns spanning years on both sides of TRA86 is required, so that 
the distinction between passive and nonpassive investments in the years after 
TRA86 can be used  to classify  the income and losses  in the years before 
TRA86. 
Table 7.5 presents tabulations of partnership losses from 1986 by  whether 
the taxpayer also reported passive partnership income or losses during any of 
the years from 1987-90.28  Of the 10,341 tax returns in the 1986 data set, 346, 
27. The “price” of a tax shelter can be conceptualized as the magnitude of the fees a tax shelter 
promoter would require from investors. Although such fees were omitted from the initial outlays 
in the illustrative tax shelters, in a competitive market they are clearly endogenously determined. 
The  size of the fees will determine how much of the tax benefits the investor will have to share 
with the promoter. 
28. The panel of tax returns is a random subsample of the IRS Statistics of  home  public-use 
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Table 1.5  Change in  Marginal Tax Rates (MTRs) by Partnership Status 
Average 
First- 
Percentage with  ~~ll~~ 
Has Passive  Passive Partnership  MTR 
Has Partnership  Partnership  Number of  Percentage of  Losses 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Losses 1986  Post-TRA86  Returns  Category  Post-TRA86  1986  1988 
No  No  9,799  98.04  0  16  16 
Yes  196  1.96  53  26  22 
Total  9,995  100.00  1  17  16 
Yes  No  100  28.90  0  22  20 
Yes  246  71.10  91  33  26 
Total  346  100.00  65  30  24 
Total  10,341  100.00  3  17  16 
Source: Author’s calculations from the University of Michigan panel of tax returns and the NBER 
TAXSIM program. 
or 3.3 percent, reported partnership losses in 1986. The classification excludes 
those returns with partnership income but no losses because the objective is to 
identify tax shelterers, not just partners, prior to disposition in the pre-TRA86 
period. Within this group, 246, or 7 1.1 percent, reported income or loss from 
a passive partnership in the post-TRA86 period. This group will be identified 
as the “tax shelterers” in  1986.29  Column (5) shows that 91 percent of  this 
group reported actual passive losses after TRA86. 
Having identified a group of  taxpayers as tax shelterers, it is possible to 
determine the average marginal tax rate on partnership losses that prevailed 
prior to TRA86. In doing so, it is important to do a “first dollar” calculation- 
that is, to set partnership net income to zero-because  large partnership losses 
lower the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. The first-dollar marginal tax rate is a 
better measure of the tax incentive to shelter income than is the more tradi- 
tional “last dollar” calculation. Column (6) of table 7.5 shows that this rate is 
33 percent on average for those who sheltered income in  1986. The NBER 
TAXSIM tax calculation program is used to construct this estimate.30  One of 
the many useful capabilities of  the TAXSIM program is that it can compute 
29. Although data on S-corporations, estates, and trusts reported on schedule E are available 
and subject to the passive loss rules, those data are excluded from these tabulations because tax 
shelters are usually organized as partnerships. Unfortunately, the individual tax return data does 
not distinguish between limited and general partnerships. 
30. TAXSIM is a detailed microsimulation model of the U.S. federal and state income tax sys- 
tems, originally used to study the effects of tax deductibility on charitable giving by Feldstein and 
Taylor (1976) and substantially extended to study the integration of the personal and corporate 
income tax systems by Feldstein and Frisch (1977). Feenberg and Coutts (1993) provide an intro- 
duction to the TAXSIM model. 212  Andrew A. Samwick 
Table 7.6  Distribution of Partnership Losses and Marginal Tax Rates (MTFb): 
Tax Shelter Investors in 1986 
Weighted 
Percentage of  Average MTR 
Number of  Percentage of  Partnership Losses 
First-Dollar  Returns  Returns  1986  1986  1988 





















































0  5 
8  15 
14  4 
16  16 
21  24 
21  28 
32  29 
31  32 
42  33 
48  31 
50  28 
41  21 
-  - 
Source: Author’s calculations from the University of  Michigan panel of  tax returns and the NBER 
TAXSIM program. 
the marginal tax rates under alternative scenarios, including the tax rules pre- 
vailing in years other than that of  the data. Column (7) shows that the average 
first-dollar marginal tax rate on partnership losses for the tax shelterers would 
have fallen to 26 percent under the 1988 tax rules.31 
Table 7.6 shows the decline in marginal tax rates for the group of tax shelter- 
ers based on the level of their 1986 marginal tax rate. In this table, marginal 
tax rates are weighted by the taxpayer’s level of partnership losses so that the 
marginal tax rates of taxpayers who are sheltering more income are weighted 
more heavily in the average.32  As shown by columns (4) and (5)  of the last row, 
dollar-weighting  the marginal tax rates  shows a decline from 41 percent  in 
1986 to 27 percent in 1988. Columns (2) and (3) show that although taxpayers 
with the top marginal tax rate constituted only 13.82 percent of the tax shelter- 
ers, they represented 50.52 percent of the partnership losses. Every taxpayer in 
this tax bracket would have faced a 28 percent marginal tax rate under the 1988 
tax schedule with the same reported income. Thus, the tax rates assumed in 
the examples in the previous section do represent a majority of the tax shelter- 
31. Repeating this analysis (and that in table 7.6) on the tax returns from  1984 and  1985, or 
requiring partnership activity in  all thrcc years, yielded only trivial differences froin those re- 
ported here. 
32. Dollar-weighted marginal fax rates measure the marginal tax rate on each dollar of partner- 
ship loss rather than the marginal tax rate on each taxpayer who reports partnership losses. 213  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Table 7.7  Tax Shelter Rates of Return under Alternative Marginal Tax Rates 
Marginal Tax Rate 
Shelter  50  32  33  28 
Equipment-leasing shelter (no leverage) 
Pre-TRA86  8.22 
Pre-TRA86 without ITC  5.64 
Pre-TRA86 with PLL  6.58 
Post-TRA86 without PLL 
Post-TRA86 with PLL 
Equipment-leasing shelter (50 percent leverage) 
Re-TRA86  14.38 
Pre-TRA86 without ITC  6.81 
Pre-TRA86 with PLL  7.47 
Post-TRA86 without PLL 
Post-TRA86 with PLL 
Pre-TRA86  21.88 
Post-TRA86 without PLL 
Post-TRA86 with PLL 




6.90  7.24 




7.20  7.28 
5.46  5.81 
20.04 
13.54  14.17 
12.37  13.15 
Note: IRRs correspond to the investments from tables 7.2-7.4 
ing that occurred prior to TRA86, and approximately 83.79 percent of the tax 
shelterers faced lower marginal tax rates after TRA86 than before. 
Table 7.6 also demonstrates that tax shelters are not uniformly held by  in- 
vestors in the top marginal tax bracket. If the demand for tax-sheltered invest- 
ments by taxpayers facing the top marginal tax rate is less than the supply, then 
tax shelters will have to be priced to attract investors in lower marginal tax 
brackets. As has often been noted in discussions of tax-exempt securities, this 
generates a pure rent for investors in the top marginal tax brackets.33  Table 7.6 
shows that under the 1986 tax schedule, 35 percent of the partnership losses of 
tax shelterers were reported by  individuals with marginal tax rates at least 5 
percentage points below the top rate. Because TRA86 compressed the number 
of tax brackets, column (5) shows that, in contrast, over 85 percent of the part- 
nership losses of tax shelterers would have been within 5 percentage points of 
the top rate (here, the 33 percent bubble). Thus, to the extent that the investor’s 
marginal tax rate is an important determinant of  the IRR on the tax shelter, 
TRA86 reduced the scope for such rents to be earned by top marginal tax rate 
investors (and even more so for very high income taxpayers, who did not face 
the top marginal tax rate). 
Table 7.7 presents the IRRs from the tax  shelters described in tables 7.2 
through 7.4 under alternative marginal tax rate assumptions. Focusing first on 
the real estate tax shelter at the bottom of the table, the IRR falls from 21.88 
33. This issue is discussed in connection with tax shelters by Cordes and Galper (1985). 214  Andrew A. Samwick 
to 20.04 percent when the marginal tax rate is changed from 50 to 32 percent 
(the average tax rate for the marginal tax rate group that saw a reduction in tax 
rates due to TRA86). The potential rents earned by  the higher marginal tax 
bracket investors on this are equivalent  to those  obtained  if  the  same two 
groups both invested in a municipal bond that offered a pretax equivalent rate 
of return of 10 percent to the investor with the 32 percent marginal rate. 
When the same shelter is evaluated under the post-TRA86  tax rules, the 
investment actually has a higher IRR at a marginal tax rate of 28 percent (14.17 
percent) than a 33 percent (13.54 percent). For this calculation, the passive 
loss rules have not been imposed; the reversal exists because TRA 86 length- 
ened the depreciation schedules and, most important, eliminated conversion to 
capital gains by repealing the long-term exclusion. Imposing the passive loss 
rules increases the discrepancy only slightly. The middle set of numbers shows 
that an analogous conclusion can be drawn from the equipment-leasing shelter 
that borrowed half of the initial outlay. Because the equipment lease did not 
involve conversion to capital gains, simply removing the ITC was enough to 
make the shelter less appealing at higher tax rates.34 
Thus far in the analysis, all tax shelter investors have been individual taxpay- 
ers, but this does not have to be the case. Corporations can also purchase inter- 
ests in limited partnerships, and after TRA86, may have been the more natural 
clientele for tax shelters than  any cohort of  individuals. One reason is that 
corporations are not subject to passive loss rules if they are widely 
Another is that the reductions in individual marginal tax rates in TRA86 were 
not quite matched for corporations. The top marginal tax rate for corporate 
income fell from 46 to 34 percent as a result of TRA86, making the corporate 
rate higher than the top individual rate for the first time. If depreciation allow- 
ances are available, the owner of the asset should have the highest marginal tax 
rate in order to maximize the value of the tax deferral.36 
It is unlikely that this “inversion” of top marginal tax rates or the absence of 
the passive loss rules for corporations should have resulted in a migration of 
the ownership of depreciable assets to the corporate sector. The most important 
reason is that the higher marginal tax rate only matters if the shelter can gener- 
34. The first set of IRRs shows that even in the pre-TRA86 period, the unleveraged equipment 
leasing investment afforded higher rates of  return to the low marginal tax rate investor. If the 
residual value of the equipment at the end of the shelter were much less than the assumed 90 
percent, the return to the high marginal tax rate investor could have been made higher than that of 
the low marginal tax rate investor. For example, with a residual value of 40 percent, the SO percent 
marginal tax rate yields an after-tax rate of return of 2.92 percent, compared to 2.80 percent for 
the 32 percent marginal tax rate investor. 
3.5. Brumbaugh and Ward (1987) provide a more detailed explanation of the rules determining 
whether an entity is subject to the passive loss rules. 
36. I am indebted to Roger Gordon for first pointing out to me the relevance of the corporate 
tax rate changes to tax  shelters after TRA86. As with the individual income tax  schedule, the 
corporate schedule contained a 5 percentage point bubble to phase out the benefits of lower infra- 
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ate losses that are not recaptured at that same rate in a short period of  time. 
The repeal of the ITC and the lengthening of real estate depreciation schedules 
after TRA86 affected corporations as well as individuals. Furthermore, shifting 
ownership of  depreciable assets to high tax rate entities makes sense only if 
the after-tax rate of return increases with the tax rate. Another reason is that 
the inversion proved to be a short-lived phenomenon, and this was not wholly 
unanticipated. The top marginal tax rate for individuals was increased to 39.6 
percent  by  the Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation Act  of  1993, a rate that is 
higher than the similarly increased 35 percent top rate on corporations, and a 
preferential 28 percent maximum rate on long-term capital gains was reestab- 
lished. 
The possible migration of depreciable assets into the corporate sector not- 
withstanding, the implications of the comparisons in table 7.7 for the existence 
of a tax shelter clientele are profound. Investments that before TRA86 could 
be used as tax shelters are no longer most profitably held by top marginal tax 
rate investors. In a competitive equilibrium, these investments should be made 
by individuals in the lowest marginal tax brackets rather than the highest ones. 
High-bracket investors would likely earn higher risk-adjusted returns by hold- 
ing tax-exempt bonds, especially if they were priced to attract investors from 
lower marginal tax brackets.37  If the correlation between the marginal tax rate 
and the after-tax IRR is not positive, then it is difficult to think of the invest- 
ment as a tax shelter in the traditional sense. Again, the passive loss limitations 
are not necessary for this change in the tax shelter clientele, given the other 
reforms enacted by TRA86. 
The  sample tax  shelters  discussed  in this  arld  the previous  section also 
clearly show the potential economic dislocations caused by  the passive loss 
rules. Because they target losses, and tax losses are magnified by leverage, the 
passive loss rules discourage the use of  debt to purchase depreciable assets. 
Investors who would otherwise require debt to finance their investments are 
thereby hindered. Since losses and gains are treated asymmetrically, the pas- 
sive loss rules also discriminate against riskier investments that yield larger 
and more frequent losses for a given expected rate of return. Because they 
discriminate between investors who happen to have passive income from other 
investments and those who do not, the passive loss rules create a more hetero- 
geneous pool of potential investors, thereby impeding the full capitalization of 
the tax benefits (assuming any can still be found) that would occur if a given 
clientele of investors could absorb the entire supply of tax shelters. But, most 
important, the passive losses do not distinguish  between genuine economic 
37. This conclusion will not necessarily hold if taxpayers with higher marginal tax rates are less 
risk averse than  those with lower marginal tax rates. In that case, the  clientele for former tax 
shelters will be composed of the  least risk-averse high-bracket investors in addition to somewhat 
more risk averse low-bracket investors. 216  Andrew A. Samwick 
losses and those that might be due solely to the tax-related incentives that have 
been written into the law. Noncorporate enterprises are consequently hampered 
relative to corporations in undertaking risky  investment^.^^ 
7.3  Targeting Abusive Tax Shelters 
An important assumption in the foregoing analysis of tax shelters has been 
that all assets are traded at a fair market value. In transactions without im- 
portant tax consequences, a fair market value prevails because buyers have no 
interest in paying too much for an asset and sellers have no interest in receiving 
too little. Abuse of  tax shelters creeps into the system when the transaction 
price of the asset is artificially inflated to allow the investor to claim deprecia- 
tion allowances that are not only accelerated but far in excess of the fair market 
value of  the asset. What should be apparent to the dispassionate observer is 
that under normal circumstances, the tax shelter promoter who sells the asset 
should be unwilling to agree to overstate the transaction price if  he incurs an 
added tax liability but receives no real compensation for it. The important in- 
sight due to Sims (1994) is that the key to abusive tax shelters is therefore the 
mechanism that allows the seller to escape taxation on the artificially inflated 
price. This section shows that the mechanism identified by Sims-the  combi- 
nation of purchase-money debt and installment sale reporting of the gain-is 
in substance a pure deferral shelter.39  Consequently, the passive loss rules were 
sufficient to eliminate abusive tax shelters. As in the case of  legitimate tax 
shelters, however, they were hardly necessary. 
The government has generally been aware that tax shelter abuse must be 
related to the amount of debt used to purchase the depreciable asset. An early 
attempt to curtail the use of debt in abusive tax shelters was the passage of the 
at-risk rules in 1976 as section 465 of the Internal Revenue Code. As discussed 
in the real estate shelter example, the at-risk rules restrict the amount of  de- 
ductible loss from the ownership of  depreciable property to the total amount 
of  the taxpayer’s economic investment, that is, the amount the investor has at 
risk in the transaction. The at-risk rules specify that borrowed funds are at risk 
only to the extent that they are secured by  the investor’s other personal assets 
or that the taxpayer is personally liable to repay them. So-called nonrecourse 
loans, in which the investor’s obligation to the lender is limited to the asset that 
secures the loan, are not deemed to be at risk and cannot be counted in the 
investment’s depreciable basis. 
38. Limited partnerships such as venture capital funds whose objectives are to undertake risky 
but ex ante profitable investments exclusive of tax preferences would be less likely to be disposed 
of within a few years; hence, the elimination of deferral that results from the passive loss rules 
would have a larger effect on genuine economic losses than losses motivated by tax considerations. 
39. This section draws heavily on the insights of Sims (1994). as well as helpful conversations 
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On the surface, the at-risk rules appear to be able to eliminate tax shelter 
abuse by preventing investors from using debt that they will not have to repay 
in full to inflate the asset’s basis for depreciation. Sims (1994) shows, in con- 
trast, that the at-risk rules were inadequate because the practical distinction 
between nonrecourse and recourse debt in tax shelters is small. One reason is 
that default on even a nonrecourse loan will harm the investor’s future access 
to credit. Another is that even loans with personal recourse can be defaulted. 
But the most important reason is that any amount of nonrecourse debt that is 
not repaid must be included as “cancellation of indebtedness” (COD) income 
in the investor’s gross income for tax purposes when default occurs.4o  Thus, the 
“giveaway” is more apparent than real; an  investor cannot effectively evade 
taxation by defaulting on a nonrecourse loan. 
The failing of the at-risk rules is that a nonrecourse loan is not substantively 
different from a recourse loan; there are consequences of default that make it 
an  undesirable outcome.”1  As a result, it is unlikely to generate significant 
abuse of  the tax advantages in a shelter. In order to facilitate abuse, the loan 
must be such that default is a planned event and is mutually satisfactory to the 
lender and the borrower. The only lender that could possibly be indifferent to 
default on the loan to finance a tax shelter investment is the tax shelter pro- 
moter who sells the assets. It is therefore “purchase money” financing from the 
seller that is the key ingredient of tax shelter abuse. But purchase money alone 
does not guarantee that the promoter will agree to overstate the sale price of 
the asset if he or she incurs an immediate tax liability on the transaction. Some 
mechanism must be found for the promoter to avoid this tax liability. In the 
most flagrant cases, that has been the installment sales treatment in section 453 
of the Internal Revenue Code.42  Installment sale reporting allows the seller to 
pay taxes on gain from the sale of the asset in proportion to the amount of the 
total contract price that is actually paid at any given time, that is, the fraction 
of the total price that is not purchase money. 
In Sims’s example, the promoter produces a teakettle for $750 and agrees to 
sell it for $1,000 in cash plus a $2,000 note from the buyer (payable in full at 
the end of the shelter) for a total contract price of $3,000. The promoter’s gain 
for tax purposes is the $2,250 between his sale price and his production costs. 
However, the installment sale rules allow him to pay taxes on only the fraction 
of that price that he has received at the time of  sale: (1,000/3,000)*2,250, or 
$750 dollars. As long as his tax rate is lower than 33 percent in this case, his 
tax liability will be less than his $250 in  actual gain on the sale, that is, the 
40. See Chirelstein (1994) for a more detailed discussion of COD income. 
41. Coven (1986) critiques the at-risk rules along these lines. 
42. Sims (1  994) draws this conclusion based on an examination of the tax shelter case law since 
the passage of the at-risk rules and discusses other more-limited means by which the basis of the 
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$1,000 in cash less the $750 in production  The promoter then agrees 
to allow the buyer to default on the $2,000 note.  In the meantime, the tax 
shelter investor has taken the accelerated depreciation on the inflated contract 
price and has only to pay tax on the $2,000 (as COD income) when he defaults 
on the note at the end of the shelter. As long as this can pass the at-risk rules 
by being recourse debt (or be done on real estate transactions, which are less 
encumbered by the at-risk rules), the sham transaction works. Since the pro- 
moter earns his livelihood by facilitating this type of abuse, reputational con- 
siderations will virtually guarantee that he chooses not to enforce the debt even 
though he is legally entitled to do so. His long-term incentive is not to expropri- 
ate his customers. 
In this example, the investor was able to take $2,000 of  extra accelerated 
depreciation and then pay tax on the $2,000 in a later year. It is a pure deferral 
shelter, as in the case of the cattle-feeding shelter discussed in section 7.1, with 
the added bonus that unlike the cattle-feeding shelter, in which the magnitude 
of the gain was constrained by the progressivity of the tax code, the deferral in 
the teakettle shelter is unlimited. As long as the promoter obtains the $I ,000 
in cash for the teakettle, he will always be able to cover his tax liability by using 
the installment sale reporting regardless of the amount of purchase money he 
offers the investor. The depreciable asset itself is almost irrelevant; it simply 
provides access to the favorable depreciation on a paper transaction. The clever 
point made by Sims is that it might just as well be a teakettle. 
Table 7.8 revisits the equipment-leasing tax shelter without leverage from 
table 7.2 to demonstrate the effects of the purchase-money debt on the IRR of 
the shelter and the role of passive loss limitations in eliminating this type of 
abuse. In this case, the investor pays the same $10,000 initially, receives the 
same cash flows as rent and management fees from leasing the equipment, and 
sells the asset for the same residual value. The only change that has been made 
is the addition of $30,000 in seller financing, which appears only in year six 
when the investor defaults on the note and pays ordinary income tax on it. In 
the pre-TRA86 period, this inflates both the ITC and the depreciation allow- 
ances by a factor of four and increases the IRR from 8.22 to 43.08 percent. 
When the ITC is removed, the IRR increase is more modest, from 5.64 to 19.12 
percent. If  the ITC is retained but the passive loss rules are applied to the pre- 
TRA86 period, the IRR increases from 6.58 to 10.76 percent. It is the presence 
of the ITC which makes this more than just a pure deferral shelter, since the 
ITC is never recapt~red.~~  Under the post-TRA86 period  marginal tax rates, 
the IRR increases from 7.24 to 12.06 percent. The more modest increase is a 
43. More generally, Sims shows that the promoter need only require a cash payment of at least 
c/( 1 -  r) to break even, where c is the cost of the asset and t is his marginal tax rate, regardless of 
the amount of purchase money in the deal. 
44. Alternatively, the ITC is equivalent to an extra depreciation allowance that is recaptured at 
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Table 7.8  “Abusive” Equipment-Leasing  Tax Shelter before and after TRA86 
Year 








Initial outlay  -  .40,000 
30,000  0 
-4,000 
1,200 
-  180 








-8.400  - 
0 
1,200 
-  180 
-8,400 
B. Pre-TRA86 with ITC 
Taxable income  -4,980  -7,780  -7,380  -7,380 
Taxes paid  -6,490  -3,890  -3,690  -3,690 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000  7,510  4,910  4,710  4,710 
IRR  43.08 
C. Pre-TRA86 without ITC 
Taxable income  -4,980  -7,780  -7,380  -7,380 
Taxes paid  -2,490  -3,890  -3,690  -3,690 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000  3,510  4,910  4,710  4,710 
IRR  19.12 
D. Pre-TM86 with PLL 
Taxable income  0  0  0  0 
Taxes paid  0  0  0  0 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000  1,020  1,020  1,020  1,020 
IRR  10.76 
E. Post-TRA86 without PLL 
Taxable income  -4,980  -7,780  -7,380  -7,380 
Taxes paid  -1,394  -2,178  -2,066  -2,066 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000  2,414  3,198  3,086  3,086 
IRR  12.06 
E Post-TRA86 with PLL 
Taxable income  0  0  0  0 
Taxes paid  0  0  0  0 
After-tax cash flow  -  10,000  1,020  1,020  1,020  1,020 








































Nore: See text (sec. 7.3) for assumptions. IRR values are percentages. 
result of  the lower value of  the overstated depreciation  deductions at a top 
marginal tax rate of  28 percent. Finally, once the ITC has been removed, the 
shelter becomes a pure deferral shelter and the passive loss limitations elimi- 
nate all gains from the purchase-money financing. The IRR is unchanged from 
table 7.2 at 6.78 percent. 
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that has no function but to reduce payments to the Treasury. As long as the 
shelter is subject to recapture of all tax benefits at the same tax rate as they are 
deducted (i.e., no conversion), the passive loss rules are sufficient to remove 
the mechanism through which shelters become abusive. It is also clear that the 
passive loss rules are far more than what is necessary to accomplish this objec- 
tive. The appearance of a loss is not the problem, nor is the use of debt which 
magnifies that loss. The two problems are the escape hatch provided by  the 
installment sale treatment of the seller’s gain and the unlimited deferral through 
purchase-money debt. The former was effectively repealed by the Revenue Act 
of 1987, which required that installment sellers pay interest on the tax liability 
deferred due to nonrecognition of a gain under section 453. Sims argues that 
in most cases (including his teakettle shelter), such interest penalties would be 
prohibitive and proposes an even simpler solution that focuses on the latter: 
disallow any basis attributable to the use of purchase money in tax shelters. 
Such a provision would be similar in spirit to the at-risk rules but would recog- 
nize that it is seller financing, rather than nonrecourse debt, that is the catalyst 
of tax shelter abuse. It would also not invalidate genuine economic losses as 
do the passive loss limitations. Instead, it would merely require that an outside 
lender provide the financing for legitimate tax shelters. As long as the outside 
lender has the same information  about the borrower as does the seller, this 
requirement imposes no efficiency loss. 
7.4  Distribution of Passive Losses 
As suggested by table 7.6, tax shelters in the pre-TRA86 period were heavily 
concentrated in the high end of the income distribution. Any hypothesized ef- 
fect of the passive loss rules on investments in tax shelters would therefore be 
borne disproportionately by high-income taxpayers. Since income redistribu- 
tion is often a goal of tax policy and a requirement of major tax reforms such 
as TRA86, this section considers the effect of the passive loss rules on the 
distribution of the federal tax burden across the population of taxpayers. 
Table 7.9 begins by examining the fraction of tax returns that were directly 
affected by the passive loss limitations during the phase-in period. Because of 
the concentration of passive losses at high income levels, the data are taken 
from the public-use files of the IRS Statistics of Income for the four years after 
TRA86. Unlike the panel data set used for table 7.6, these cross-sectional files 
are  stratified by  income level  with  high-income returns  oversampled. The 
oversampling of the part of the income distribution where the losses are con- 
centrated increases the precision of the estimates. The first line of  the table 
shows that the fraction of returns filing schedule E declined in each year, from 
13.06 percent in 1987 to 12.60 percent in 1990.  As mentioned above, schedule 
E must be filed by  taxpayers with income or losses from rental real estate, 
partnerships, S-corporations, trusts, or estates. Aggregate losses on schedule E 
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Table 7.9  Aggregate Passive Loss Limitations, 1987-90 
Yea 
1987  1988  1989  1990 
Returns filing schedule E (%) 
Reporting passive losses 
With passive loss limitation 
Aggregate schedule E losses (billion 1990 $) 
Aggregate disallowed passive losses 
Aggregate passive losses 
Passive losses disallowed (%) 

































Source: Author’s calculations from the annual IRS Staristics of Income public-use cross sections. 
same period.45  The discrepancy is a consequence of the incentives TRA86 pro- 
vided for profit-making enterprises to organize as S-corporations and partner- 
ships rather than C-corporations by  lowering the top personal tax rate below 
the corporate tax rate on  The fraction of returns that reported passive 
losses from any of these sources conditional on filing schedule E also fell dra- 
matically over this period, from 29.86 percent in  1987 to 23.50 percent in 
1990.47  The decline in the aggregate value of passive losses was $21.7 billion, 
or 28.2 percent of the total in 1987. 
Taxpayers who report passive losses are required to file form 8582 in order 
to determine whether the passive loss limitations apply to them. If the limita- 
tions bind, the disallowed amount is carried forward to the next year. In each 
year,  the fraction of taxpayers with passive losses who reported more losses 
than they were allowed was approximately 40 percent, and the aggregate value 
of these disallowed losses was between $15.3 and $20.9 billion over this pe- 
riod. The fraction of  passive losses that were disallowed increased steadily 
from 19.88 to 42.24 percent over the four-year period. In each year, this frac- 
tion was approximately half of the statutory rate of  disallowance for passive 
losses in excess of passive gains. That roughly half of the passive losses were 
not disallowed suggests that investors were able to successfully match at least 
some passive losses to passive income.48 
45. All dollar amounts in this section are in constant 1990 dollars. 
46. See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1990, 1994) for a theoretical discussion and an estimate 
of the tax distortions in the choice of organizational form before TRA86. Plesko (1994) estimates 
the effect of tax factors on conversions to S-corporations after TRA86. Guenther (1992) and Gen- 
try (1994) examine the importance of tax considerations in the behavior of master limited partner- 
ships relative to corporations. 
47. These passive losses do not include passive losses carried forward from previous years. 
48. After TRA86, there was a premium on passive-income generators, affectionately referred to 
as PIGs. As discussed by Gentry (1994). the use of PIGs was curtailed for publicly traded partner- 
ships in  1987 by  requiring that losses from a publicly traded partnership  (PTP) could only be 
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Table 7.10  Incidence of Passive Loss Limitations by Positive Income Level, 1987-90 
Positive  Average 
Income  Positive  Share of Total  Share of Aggregate  Share of Aggregate  Share of 
LevePb  Incomeb  Tax Returns  Passive Losses  Disallowed Losses  Aggregate Taxes 
1987 
Under 10  4.69 
10-25  16.85 
50-100  65.51 
100-250  142.10 
Over 250  645.75 
Under 10  4.62 
10-25  16.93 
25-50  35.96 
50-100  65.66 
100-250  142.41 
Over 250  733.54 
Under 10  4.60 
10-25  16.85 
50-100  65.88 
Over 250  690.05 
Under 10  4.64 
10-25  16.84 
25-50  35.78 
100-250  141.59 
Over 250  682.58 
25-50  35.95 
1988 
1989 
25-50  35.83 
100-250  140.94 
1990 

































































































Source: Author’s calculations from the annual IRS Srurisrics of  Income public-use cross sections 
“Positive income is the sum of all positive components of total income. 
bDollar amounts in thousands of constant 1990 dollars. 
Table 7.10 presents the distribution of each aggregate by “positive income” 
for each year. This measure of income is simply the sum of all positive compo- 
nents of income, before the netting out of losses.49  In each year, the group of 
taxpayers with over $250,000 in positive income-the  top 0.60 percent of the 
distribution-reported  half of the passive losses and slightly more than half of 
49. Specifically, positive income is the sum of wages, taxable interest, nontaxable interest, divi- 
dends, social security benefits, unemployment insurance included in adjusted gross income, capital 
gains, partnership income, S-corporation income, estate income, farm rents, rental income, royalty 
income, and self-employment income. The last four are included only to the extent that the re- 
ported net figure is positive. This measure is similar to, but not necessarily equivalent to, that of 
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the disallowed passive losses. This is more than double their share of the total 
income taxes paid, which was just under one-fourth in each year. If the group 
of taxpayers is expanded to those with over $100,000 of positive income (the 
top 3 percent), the shares of passive losses, disallowed losses, and the current 
tax liability rise to 70, 80, and 40 percent, respectively. 
The implication of table 7.10 is that, whatever the ultimate revenue effect of 
the disallowance of passive losses, it will be borne almost entirely by the very 
highest income taxpayers.50  Since the analysis in section 7.3 showed that the 
passive loss rules were not necessary to eliminate abusive tax shelters, there 
are only three sources of increased revenue that are appropriately attributed to 
them. The first is from the tax losses that are no longer reported by legitimate 
tax shelters that would have been reported given all changes in TRA other than 
the passive loss rules but will not be reported because of these rules (e.g., some 
cattle-feeding shelters). Since the examples in section 7.1 showed that the mar- 
ginal effect of the passive loss rules on the after-tax IRR was approximately 1 
percentage point, this is likely to be a very small amount of revenue. The sec- 
ond is from the inclusion of allowed passive  losses as a tax preference for 
the alternative minimum tax calculation during the phase-in period. This tax 
preference is unfortunately not separately or easily identifiable in the public- 
use files of tax returns. In any event, it is explicitly a short-term revenue source. 
The third is the various instances in which the passive loss rules will bind in a 
given year and defer the investor’s tax loss until a year in which the investor 
reports positive passive income. In those cases, government revenues will be 
increased by the interest on the potential tax loss during the years of deferral. 
Assuming an average 20 percent last-dollar marginal tax rate on passive losses 
(calculated  from TAXSIM)  and  a  10  percent  discount  rate,  this  increase 
amounts to 2 percent of disallowed losses per year of deferral. Assuming one 
year of deferral and $20 billion of disallowed losses per year, this represents a 
$0.4 billion increase in annual revenues. This amount is trivial compared to 
aggregate tax revenues or the taxes paid  by  the top 0.60 percent of  the in- 
come distribution. 
7.5  Conclusion 
The tax shelter examples demonstrated that the impact of the passive loss 
limitations on legitimate tax  shelter investments  was largely redundant. The 
passive loss rules eliminated the tax advantages of pure deferral shelters. In 
50. It is important to note that tables 7.9 and 7.10 reflect the aging of  tax shelters that were 
purchased under the pre-TRA86 regime. Because limited partnerships are highly illiquid in most 
cases, investors could not easily avoid the passive loss rules on their existing tax shelters. Although 
some tax shelter investors undoubtedly  sold their investments in  1986 in  anticipation of, or in 
response to, the passage of TRA86 (and are therefore not included in the tables), Darnato (1995a) 
reports that many of  these investors-and  their heirs-are  still burdened by  these partnerships 
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practice, the conversion of ordinary income to a lightly taxed (capital gain) or 
untaxed (ITC) form was a more important determinant of the IRR on the tax- 
sheltered investment, and passive loss rules do not affect conversion. TRA86’s 
repeal of the provisions that allowed for conversion were the decisive blow to 
legitimate  tax  shelters;  once these changes were  incorporated,  applying  the 
passive loss rules had only a minor effect on the after-tax IRR on investment. 
Once conversion was eliminated, the correlation between the after-tax rate of 
return on investment and the investor’s marginal tax rate was no longer posi- 
tive; consequently, high-income  taxpayers  were not the natural clientele for 
legitimate tax-sheltered investments after TRA86. 
The analysis of abusive tax shelters showed that passive losses were suffi- 
cient to eliminate the abuse because it took the form of pure deferral. As in the 
case of legitimate shelters, however, they were unnecessary. The changes to the 
installment sale treatment of gains that occurred a year later were a more direct 
attack with fewer unrelated  consequences. The passive loss rules punish all 
losses, including genuine economic losses and interest deductions, rather than 
just those that cause the abuse. Similarly, the disallowance of basis due to pur- 
chase money for depreciation  purposes  would have eliminated  the ability to 
shelter absent of economic risk without the potential for discouraging  legiti- 
mate economic enterprises. Estimating the impact of the passive loss rules on 
risky investment in the noncorporate sector is therefore an important direction 
for further research. 
The passive loss rules therefore represent a policy without a substantive eco- 
nomic purpose but with a large potential to discourage legitimate investment. 
Their chief  effect is cosmetic; high-income  taxpayers  can no longer use the 
losses from the tax shelter to reduce the taxes paid on other income earned that 
year. The suggestion that this cosmetic change, in the absence of a large impact 
on the after-tax IRR of the investment, would help eliminate tax shelters re- 
quires that tax shelter investors systematically ignore recapture in their invest- 
ment decisions. Instead, recent studies of high-income taxpayers such as Auten 
and Carroll (1994), Feldstein (1993), Feenberg and Poterba (1993), and Slem- 
rod (chap. 6 in this volume) suggest a high sensitivity to tax incentives in eco- 
nomic activities with less of a tax component than tax-sheltered investments. 
Appearances aside, the important  indicator of  future increases  in legitimate 
tax-sheltered  investment is the introduction  of opportunities  for conversion, 
including investment tax credits and preferential tax treatment of capital gains. 
The recent rebound in the secondary market for real estate limited partnerships 
reported  in Damato (1995b)  suggests that  the tax  changes in  1993 may be 
having that effect. 225  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
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Comment  Roger H. Gordon 
Summary of Paper 
The key question addressed in this paper by  Samwick is the role of passive 
loss restrictions, introduced as part of  the Tax Reform Act of  1986 (hereafter 
Roger H. Gordon is professor of economics at the University of Michigan and a research associ- 
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TRA86), in ending the use of tax shelters. In the years immediately prior to 
this legislation, high-income taxpayers made intensive use of tax shelters that 
enabled them to reduce their net tax liabilities. Tax shelter activity became so 
important that the entire partnership sector generated net  tax losses. These 
losses were heavily concentrated in a few sectors, particularly real estate and 
oil and gas. 
The misinvestments that resulted in these sectors became sufficiently dra- 
matic that TM86  included a number of provisions that aimed and in fact suc- 
ceeded at eliminating most tax shelter activity. As emphasized by  Samwick, 
the act lowered personal tax rates substantially, making tax considerations less 
important. In addition, it lengthened the tax  lives for new  investments and 
eliminated the tax credit for equipment. Furthermore, it eliminated the 60 per- 
cent exclusion of  capital gains income. Finally, the legislation imposed new 
restrictions preventing individuals from using losses generated on “passive” 
investments to offset positive taxable income from other sources. 
Have these passive loss restrictions in fact played an important role in pre- 
venting the reemergence of tax shelters, or are the other changes sufficient in 
themselves? In several numerical examples that Samwick examines, the pas- 
sive loss rules seem to have little effect on the net tax liabilities generated from 
the investments described in the examples.’ Given that these passive loss rules 
likely discourage risky activities in general and have little effect on tax shelter 
activity, Samwick concludes that they merit reconsideration. 
Nature of Tax Shelters prior to TRA86 
Samwick defines tax shelters as any activity “in which the investment cost 
can be deducted from taxable income at a rate that exceeds its economic depre- 
ciation.” Yet  the sharply accelerated depreciation rates available during the 
early 1980s, and the fairly low inflation rates, mean that virtually all invest- 
ments would be tax shelters by  this definition. For purposes of  discussion, I 
will view tax shelters more narrowly to be investments that in present value 
reduce the tax liabilities of the owner and that in equilibrium will be owned 
primarily by  those in the highest tax brackets, who according to Samwick’s 
data were in fact the principal owners of these assets. 
What aspects of  the tax law prior to TRA86 allowed some investments to 
become tax shelters? Accelerated depreciation in itself is certainly not suffi- 
cient-even  with immediate expensing, the net tax payments on an investment 
have a present value of zero. With the tax credit, it is more plausible that some 
investments will on net generate tax losses in present value. All that is required 
is that the fraction of  the initial costs paid for through reduced tax liabilities 
exceed the fraction of the return paid in taxes. This occurs if k + 72 >  T,  where 
k is the tax credit rate, T is the personal tax rate, and 2 is the present value of 
1. In one example of a shelter with an overstated basis, passive loss rules do in fact have an 
important effect. But Samwick notes that other rules could eliminate these abuses more directly. 228  Andrew A. Samwick 
depreciation deductions. These assets would be owned primarily by  those in 
the highest tax brackets, however, only if their attractiveness increases, relative 
to municipal bonds, as the investor’s tax rate increases. This occurs only if k + 
Z > 1  .2 But for any plausible discount rate, this condition is not close to being 
satisfied during the period. In fact, in none of Samwick’s examples without 
debt finance are either of  these conditions  satisfied, implying that these ex- 
amples do not constitute tax shelters. 
To be a tax shelter, more is needed. One important characteristic of  many 
tax shelters is that they provide good collateral for loans, allowing the owner 
to finance an unusually high fraction of their cost with debt.3 Extra debt is 
attractive if the net-of-tax cost of the debt is cheaper than the net-of-tax return 
the individual can earn on invested funds. If we characterize the available rate 
of return for these investors by the municipal bond rate, then extra debt is more 
attractive as long as i,  >  i(  1 -  T), where i,  is the municipal bond rate and i is 
the taxable interest rate.4 In 1984, for example, the high-grade municipal bond 
rate was 10.15 percent while the taxable BAA corporate bond rate was 14.19 
percent. At the top personal tax rate of 50 percent, the gain from borrowing an 
extra dollar was therefore 10.15 -  OS(14.19) = 3.06 cents per year; for those 
in a 30 percent tax bracket, the gain from borrowing a dollar is only 0.22 cents 
per year.5 Therefore, financing even half of the investment with debt raises the 
after-tax rate of return by  1.5 percentage points for those in the top bracket,6 
while leaving the net return virtually unchanged for those in a 30 percent tax 
bracket. 
Another important characteristic of many tax shelters was the possibility of 
saving taxes by periodic sales of the asset. When an asset is sold, capital gains 
tax liability is generated, in itself imposing a tax penalty on such sales. The 
resulting  tax liabilities would be g(P -  B),  where g is the capital gains tax 
rate, P is the sale price, and B is the remaining tax basis of the asset. In addi- 
tion, however, the new owner can depreciate the asset based on the new pur- 
chase price rather than the presale tax basis, generating extra tax savings that 
in present value can be approximated by TZ(P -  B).’  On net, the tax savings 
are (TZ -  g)(P -  B)  if the asset is sold. Prior to 1986, the tax savings from the 
2. Following Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the required rate of  return on an investment is (p + 
d)(l -  k -  TZ)/(I -  7), where  p is the net-of-tax rate of return available elsewhere (e.g., on 
municipal bonds) and d is the economic depreciation rate. The derivative of this with respect to T 
is negative, indicating that the asset is more attractive as T increases, only if k + Z > 1. 
3. As emphasized by  Gordon and Slemrod (1988), partnerships  had  substantial debt during 
this period. 
4.  I assume here that extra borrowing allows the individual to reduce the amount of municipal 
bonds he needs to sell off in order to finance the investment project. 
5.  As seen in Poterba (1989), the value of  T where investors break even on extra debt has consis- 
tently been much below the highest personal tax rate. 
6. An implicit assumption here is that the individual could not have borrowed this extra amount 
without undertaking the investment and thereby having an additional asset to provide as collateral. 
7. When the depreciation formula is exponential, the present value of future depreciation deduc- 
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write-up in the basis normally more than offset the capital gains tax liabilities 
generated by  the sale,* resulting in often substantial net tax savings for the 
buyer and seller together from the sale. In fact, assets could profitably be traded 
and redepreciated  several times during their  lives. These tax  savings from 
“churning” were larger the greater the difference between the tax rates on ordi- 
nary versus capital gains income so were largest for those in the highest tax 
 bracket^.^ In all of Samwick’s examples, while tax liabilities on the sale of the 
assets are taken into account, the value of the resulting write-up in basis and 
redepreciation of the asset is ignored.’O Yet during this period the value of this 
write-up would often outweigh the capital gains liabilities incurred as a result 
of the sale. 
As noted by Samwick, there were a variety of more questionable strategies 
that could also be pursued in putting together tax shelters. One, for example, 
would be to hold the asset while it is generating substantial tax deductions but 
then to give it to one’s child before the asset is sold, so that the resulting capital 
gains are taxable at the child’s rather than the parents’ tax rate. This device is 
also of  benefit primarily to those in the highest tax brackets, for whom the 
difference between the parents’ and the child’s tax rate is greatest. 
As a result of these extra devices, assets that could easily be traded on the 
secondary market earned as a result a much higher net-of-tax return, not only 
because the purchase of the asset could be financed heavily with debt but also 
because the asset could easily be churned and so depreciated several times. 
Examples of  assets that can easily be traded include not only real estate and 
oil and gas fields, but also airplanes, computers, automobiles, and a variety of 
other types of capital equipment.” Both leverage and churning were beneficial 
primarily for those in the highest tax brackets, explaining the concentration of 
ownership of these assets in the highest tax brackets. 
The resulting tax subsidy to investment in such assets does not arise from 
specific provisions in the tax law intentionally aimed at encouraging invest- 
ment in these assets, but simply because of the existence of a dense secondary 
market for these types of capital. In fact, many of the academic studies of the 
tax reforms on 1981-83 concluded that structures faced much higher effective 
tax rates that equipment, contrary to the observed tax losses in the real estate 
industry since the reforms (see, e.g., Fullerton and Henderson  1989). Given 
that the academic studies did not forecast the shift of resources into tax shel- 
ters, it seems most unlikely that Congress intended such a shift when designing 
8. See Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987) for further discussion. 
9. Since the top personal tax rates were higher than the top corporate tax rate during this period, 
the tax savings would be larger when the asset is owned by  high tax bracket individuals rather 
than a corporation. See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) for further discussion. 
10. One further complication was the recapture rules for depreciation at rates faster than straight 
line. Given the short lifetimes, taking this into account would not change the calculations much. 
11. The essential characteristics are that the asset not be specific to a given firm and that its 
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these tax reforms. As a result, the pattern of  subsidies to tax shelters would 
appear in large part to be arbitrary and capricious, resulting in a misallocation 
of capital across uses. 
Further efficiency losses would result from the separation of ownership from 
control. In particular, during this period corporations faced a tax incentive to 
sell off nominal ownership of their buildings and equipment to noncorporate 
owners, even though the capital continued to be used within the corporation, 
since the noncorporate owners could take better advantage of the above strate- 
gies to reduce tax liabilities. This separation of ownership from control likely 
generated efficiency losses due to monitoring and agency costs. The sharp dif- 
ferences that existing during these years in the effective tax rates on different 
types  of  assets  also generated  substantial  distortions  to individual  portfolio 
holdings and therefore to the allocation of risk across investors, generating yet 
another type of efficiency loss. 
Normally, efficiency losses are an unavoidable cost of raising tax revenue in 
an equitable way.  However, this tax shelter activity not only generated clear 
efficiency losses but also lost revenue, and reduced the perceived equity of the 
tax system since the gains went largely to those in the highest tax brackets.12 
Effects of TFU86 on Tax Shelters 
Given that the existing tax shelters were inefficient and inequitable and cre- 
ated a serious erosion of tax revenue, it is not surprising that TRA86 included 
many provisions that reduced the attractiveness of tax shelters. As emphasized 
by  Samwick, personal tax rates fell, depreciation rates were decelerated, the 
investment tax credit was eliminated, and the 60 percent exclusion for capital 
gains tax rate was eliminated. Each of these changes does serve to reduce the 
attractiveness of tax shelters, as he shows. 
The increase in the capital gains tax rate has the additional effect of making 
churning unattractive. After TRA86, there is a net tax loss for the buyer and 
seller together when they exchange an asset. 
A further important provision in TRAX6, not mentioned by  Samwick, was 
the introduction of restrictions on the deductibility of interest payments. Under 
the legislation, mortgage payments could continue to be deducted on schedule 
A, but other interest payments could no longer be taken as an itemized deduc- 
tion. This provision made it much more difficult to borrow to invest in lightly 
taxed assets, in principle putting a cap on a major form of tax arbitrage. 
This cap can be effective, however, only if the individual cannot simply shift 
nonmortgage interest deductions from schedule A to a different part of the tax 
return. For example, nonmortgage debt can simply be reclassified as mortgage 
debt. This possibility does not completely undermine the restriction, however, 
12. In a full incidence study of tax shelter activity, one would need to take into account as well 
the distributional effects of the reduced prices paid by consumers for the goods produced in these 
favored industries. 231  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
since many high-income investors will need to provide more collateral than 
their house in order to maintain the level of  debt they  had prior to TRAS6. 
Another approach would be to shift the borrowing into a noncorporate business 
the individual participates in. As long as such a business can use any resulting 
tax deductions to offset other income, the restriction on interest deductions 
would be moot. A key function of the passive loss rules, therefore, may be to 
prevent such an end run around the restriction on interest deductions. 
What are the efficiency consequences of this restriction on interest deduc- 
tions? Restricting the degree to which individuals can take advantage of  ex- 
isting tax subsidies to debt finance, in itself, is likely to be an efficiency gain 
since it restricts the behavioral response to this portfolio distortion. Certainly 
some reduction in use of debt would be an efficiency gain. Jensen and Meck- 
ling (1976) explore a variety of nontax considerations that affect a firm's debt/ 
equity choice. Whether the efficient use of debt, ignoring taxes, leads to sys- 
tematic tax losses for a firm is an open question. If  not, as seems very likely, 
then restrictions on interest deductions would shift the use of debt finance to- 
ward the efficient level. 
Were it not for tax distortions, would passive loss restrictions be binding? 
If  not, would these restrictions then tend to push individuals toward efficient 
allocations? To the extent that passive losses result from large interest deduc- 
tions, then the same considerations as above arise, and most likely the reduc- 
tion in debt finance caused by  the restrictions would be an efficiency gain. 
But passive losses can result for reasons other than large interest deductions. 
Samwick argues, for example, that losses are more likely in riskier activities, 
so that restrictions on passive losses could inhibit risk taking by limited part- 
nership~.'~  But individuals with tax losses from one set of partnerships need 
simply buy shares in other partnerships that have taxable income in order to 
make use of the tax losses. Any unused losses in a given year can be carried 
forward and used to offset positive passive income in later years.I4  As a result, 
the passive loss restrictions would tend to induce investors in high tax brackets 
to shift their portfolios into activities generating tax profits, which would push 
them toward the portfolios they would choose without tax distortions. Again, 
the response should be an efficiency gain. 
The current passive loss rules are less binding than those faced by corpora- 
tions, since corporate shareholders cannot use losses from one corporation to 
offset profits from another corporation. The passive loss restrictions therefore 
reduce substantially an artificial advantage to the noncorporate form. 
It would be valuable to develop evidence on the extent to which passive loss 
restrictions have  altered debt finance decisions and individual portfolios, as 
13. Passive loss restrictions do not affect individual entrepreneurs since their activity would not 
be passive. 
14. While these carryforwards are not as valuable as immediate offsets against other income, as 
emphasized by Altshuler and Auerbach (1990), the loss from the postponement would normally 
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well as real investment behavior. Samwick’s data suggest that individuals on 
average lose few deductions as a result of these restrictions. Does this suggest 
that the passive loss restrictions have not played an important role? It is prema- 
ture to draw such a conclusion. In theory, given optimal portfolio choice in the 
face of these restrictions,  individuals should not be observed with portfolios 
that generate expected passive losses. While random events may leave them 
with passive losses ex post, they should simply rearrange their portfolio the 
following year so as to generate enough positive passive income to offset the 
loss carryforward. Transactions  costs generated from frequent readjustments 
in portfolios may outweigh the resulting tax savings, so some unused passive 
losses will remain. But evidence on the amount of these unused losses reveals 
information only about the size of the transactions costs faced when trying to 
readjust portfolios ex post and says nothing about what portfolios would look 
like if  the passive loss restriction were eliminated. Nor does it say anything 
about the distributional effects of the restriction. One approach to answering 
these questions would be to conduct a general equilibrium simulation of port- 
folio holdings and real allocations with and without the passive loss restric- 
tions. Another approach would be to look closely at the changes in behavior 
that followed TRA86. However, so many provisions changed in  1986 that it 
would be extremely difficult to isolate the effects of the passive loss restrictions 
in particular on all these aspects of behavior. 
Conclusion 
Samwick hypothesizes, and I agree, that “it is the use of leverage to finance 
tax-sheltered investments that . . .  motivated congressional reforms such as the 
passive loss rules.” This congressional concern with the use of  leverage very 
much seemed justified. Allowing nominal interest to be tax deductible while 
taxing an approximation of the real return on other assets opens up a variety 
of arbitrage opportunities among investors in different tax brackets. Gordon 
and Slemrod (1988) found that in 1983  the resulting arbitrage was sufficient to 
more than offset all the tax revenue collected on the return from real invest- 
ments. While other tax changes in 1986 helped to reduce the opportunity for 
tax shelter activity, the passive loss rules remained the key device available to 
limit the scope for tax arbitrage through borrowing to finance investments in 
more lightly taxed activities. 
Clearly, passive loss restrictions are a very inelegant means of limiting the 
scope for tax arbitrage. They do not eliminate opportunities for such arbitrage 
but only limit the amount that can be done. Better would be to eliminate the 
opportunities entirely. Most proposals for a consumption tax or value added 
tax, for example, would eliminate these arbitrage opportunities. Even under 
the income tax, shifting to the taxation and deductibility of  real rather than 
nominal interest would eliminate most of the problems. But as long as the tax 
code continues to allow the tax deductibility of nominal interest payments, it 233  Tax Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
is hard to dismiss the value of the passive loss restrictions without much more 
concrete evidence. 
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